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BLUE SKY AND BLACK GOLD: ARE MINERAL
INSTRUMENTS WITHIN THE FLORIDA
SECURITIES ACT?
HOLDEN E. SANDERS*
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CLAUSE IN rilE FLORIDA SECURITIES ACT
III. EMBROILED IN OIL-AND SECURITIES, CALIFORNIA STYLE
A. In general.
B. The Criminal cases.
C. The civil cases.
IV. UNDER TEXAS BLUE SrICES.
A. Criminal cases.
B. The civil cases: suits for commissions.
V. OTIER STATES OF MIND
NI. FLORIDA CRITIQUE
A. General considerations.
B. A specific problem area and a possible solution.
I
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen eventful years have sped by since Powell and Petteway
announced their concern over the lack of competent administrative
machinery to grind up the schemes of fraud and sharp practice in mineral
transactions.1 At that time the Sunniland well had just been brought
in and dreams of a petrolcum future for Florida were rampant. Today,
the dreamed-of era is over-due but Powell and Petteway bad pointed to
a problem which is quite independent of a local petroleum or mineral
development; inter-jurisdictional commerce in mineral transactions. Mineral
development requires capital in great quantities and it was this feverish
*Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review. Grateful acknowledgment
is made for the criticism and supervision of Professor lugh L. Sowards, dean of the
Florida Securities Act commentators.
1. Powell & Petteway, Speculation in Oil and Gas Leases and Royalty Contracts
in Florida, 17 FLA. L. J. 286 (1943).
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search for capital and its attendant abuses with which they became
concerned.
Questions of the applicability of Blue Sky laws first appeared in
California 2 and Texas3 - almost unnoticeably - in the Thirties. As the
industry grew and the search for capital was intensified, the questions
arose more frequently and in other jurisdictions. The answers were often
bitterly and expensively discovered. Florida's almost negligible experience
occurred in the late Thirties and early Forties. 4 Within the past two
decades a definite field of litigation has clearly evolved at the crossroads
of Blue Sky legislation and mineral commerce. By summarizing these
developments and interpreting them with a view toward the Florida
Securities Act, it is hoped the profession will be afforded an ounce or
two of prevention.
Scope is necessarily limited to what mineral transactions involve
securities without seriously considering the problems of exemption, issuance,
and registration which are adequately treated elsewhere.15 Questions involving
the federal securities laws are likewise purposely avoided. This empirical
treatment is followed by a critique and speculative analysis with regard
to the Florida Securities Act, especially as it affects securities and real
estate dealers.
II
LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND EXECUTIvE TREATMENT OF TUE MINERALS
CLAUSE IN TIlE FLORIDA SECURITIES ACT
The genesis of mineral transactional problems of any securities act
is the definitions section and, specifically, the statutory expression of what
constitutes "securities." The Florida section is Chapter 517.02 (1) which
declares a security to be, among a host of other things, any "certificate of
interest in an oil, gas, petroleum, mineral or mining title or lease, or the
right to participate therein ... " Even if this unequivocal statement were
absent, such interests are still subject to the act by a subsequent clause
which states that "interests in or under a profit sharing or participation
agreement or scheme . . ." are securities.0
The minerals clause has not remained untouched by the three govern-
mental branches since the original enactment of the Uniform Sale of
2. E.g., Domestic and Foreign Petroleum Corp. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d
73 (1935).
3. E.g., Muse v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. R. 622, 132 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1939).
4. Ryan v. State, 128 Fla. 1 ,174 So. 438 (1937); Ryan v. State, 131 Fla. 486,
180 So. 10 (1938); Boyer v. Black, 154 Fla. 723, 18 So.2d 886 (1944).
5. Robinton & Sowards, The Florida Securities Act: A Re-Examination, 12 U.
MIAMi L. REv. 1 (1957); Robinton & Sowards, Florida's Blue Sky Law: The. Lawyer's
Approach, 6 MIAMI L. Q. 525 (1952).
6. Ryan v. State, supra note 4.
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Securities Act in 1931.7 At that time the clause read: ". . . certificate of
interest in an oil, gas or mining lease .... " By an amendment in 1935k
words were added to make the clause read as it does today. Immediately
after the act was passed, Attorney General George Couper Gibbs had
occasion to interpret the clause." The question had been presented to
him as to whether a contract and deed, used by the All Florida Land
Company required registration. The deed was a conveyance to the purchaser
of an undivided intcrest in an undivided 1/2 interest in property, "together
with a like undivided interest in all bonuses, royalties and rentals received
as provided for in present or future contracts in oil and gas lease" covering
the lands. The query had been made in reference to Chapter 14899, the
original act, but the Attorney General answered in the light of the then
recently passed amendment.
The instruments were securities, lie advised, in that they definitely
were rights to participate in, or certificates of interest in, an oil, gas,
petroleum, or mining title or lease and by reason of the fact that it was a
profit sharing agreement or scheme. This latter basis for the opinion was
judicially approved two years later in Ryan v. State.'0 Considering develop-
ments in other jurisdictions at the time," subsequent Florida legislation, 2
and judicial treatment, "3 the Attorney General's statements appear re-
markably advanced.
Ryan v. State"l was Florida's first judicial attempt to bring minerals
transactions within the purview of the Sale of Securities Act. The Securities
Commission sought an injunction (by virtue of section 517.19) against
Frank J. Ryan and the Ryan Florida Corporation in their sales of "Partner-
ship Profit-Sharing Agreements" and "Guaranteed Re-Sale Lease Agree-
ments" without complying with the registration provisions of the Act.
These instruments were of a hybrid character in that designated acreage
under an oil and gas lease was sold to the vendee with a provision that
7. Fla. Laws 1931, ch. 14899 § 1. This first form of the Uniform Sale of
Securities Act was withdrawn in 1943 after Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Oregon and
South Carolina, Michigan, and Alabama adopted it with various modifications. See
Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Handbook and Proceedings, 356
(1942). The new Uniform Securities Act (9C U.LA. 84) was adopted in toto by
Kansas in 1957, Kans. Laws 1957, ch, 145. Besides the other broad definitions of
securities, in the new Act, the minerals clause of section 401 (L) reads as follows:
"certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining title or lease or in pay-
ments out of production tinder such a title or lease - .
8. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 17253 § 1.
9. Op. ATT'Y GEN. (July 23, 1935. References to such opinions in this article
refer to those of the Attorney General of Florida unless otherwise noted.
10. Ryan v. State, 128 Fla. 1, 174 So. 438 (1937); Ryan v. State, 131 Fla. 486,
180 So. 10 (1938).
11. Eg., Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1947); El Claro Oil
Co. v. Daugherty, 11 Cal. App.2d 274, 53 P.2d 1028, 55 P.2d 488 (1936). See note,
10 So. CAL. L. REv. 483 (1937).
12. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 21709 § 1.
13. Bover v. Black, 154 Fla. 723, 18 So,2d 886 (1944).
14. 128 Fla. 1, 174 So. 438 (1937).
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Frank J. Ryan (individually and as president of the Ryan Florida Corp.
and as fiscal agent for Southern Petroleum Corp. and Malone and Pope,
Inc.) guaranteed to net the vendee the amount of the original considera-
tion.'4 The agreements referred to a subsequent re-sale, through the
agency of Ryan, "as soon as mutually agreed after the bringing in of
Well No. I as a producer by the Southern Petroleum Company" and
that the parties would share the proceeds equally of everything above
the original consideration. Both types of contracts involved substantially
the same provisions.
The chancellor found the transactions to be within the Act and
granted the injunction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court also held
the contracts subject to the Act but without discussion. This seems rather
strange, considering the novelty and far-reaching effects of such a decision.
However, the judgment was reversed on another ground which, it is
believed, like the Children of Strangers,15 was conceived in an atmosphere
of chance.'6 When the case appeared before the Supreme Court the second
time, the chancellor was affirmed.6a.
Attorney General Gibbs' understanding of minerals conveyancing is
further illustrated by an opinion which he issued in March, 1937. 7 The
question was asked whether "securities" were involved in a submitted
prospectus that offered for sale 1/600 of the whole royalty interest under
a lease. He answered in the affirmative, emphasizing 'title' and noting
that a royalty was usually an interest reserved under an oil lease in a
portion of the total production of oil and gas from the tract.
In 1943, the existing lucid statement of the minerals clause was
amended' 8 in such a way as to arouse no end of curiosity in the modern
examiner. It should be noted that the clause before amendment had no
geographical jurisdictional limitation; that is, the "securities" were subject
14a. One of the vendees was an 83 year old man and the consideration was a$1,000 government Bond.
15. SAXON, CHILDREN OF STRANGERS, (1937).
16. From the Complaint, paragraph Five:
"'That the undersigned State's Attorney has been requested by D. Kirk
Cunby as Examiner for the Florida Securities Commission to bring this
suit; that the said D. Kirby Gunby was ordered and directed by the Com-
mission to cause this suit to be filed as appears from a copy of said order
attached thereto as Exhibit "A" and hereby made a part of the Bill of Com-
plaint."
From the Answer:
"These defendants are without knowledge of the allegations of para-
graph five of the Bill."
The court held this was a denial and it failed to show there was suffi-
cient evidence that The Securities Commission had authorized the institu-
tion of the suit. When the cause appeared the second time before the
Supreme Court, the chancellor's decree was affirmed. Ryan v, State, 131
Fla. 486, 180 So.10 (1938).
16a. Ryan v. State, 131 Fla. 486, 180 So.l0 (1938)..
17. Op. Arr'y GEN. (March 19, 1937).
18. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 21709 § 1.
1959]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to the commission's regulation regardless of the location of the lands to
which they were related. As a matter of fact, why should it matter? It is
true that lex situs applies to land but the securities transaction was what
was sought to be regulated and there should have been no reasonable
challenge to Florida's jurisdiction in that respect. There was certainly an
abundance of authority at the time to support such a contention.10
However, the legislature in its collective wisdom thought differently.
Apparently, it was thought that the Act did not bring within the com-
mission's administrative grasp transactions made within the state affecting
lands situated outside the state. By the amendment, "in or on lands
situated outside the state, offered for sale to the public by a dealer or
salesman in this state . . ." wps added. As it turned out, the legislature
had unwittingly muddied the waters for a decade or more in its zeal to
regulate such commerce.
Within a year, the supreme court struck the amending act down
with a heavy but dull judicial axe. 20
Boyer was arrested for violation of the securities Act. He was charged
with unlawfully engaging in the business of dealing in securities issued
by another without having registered them and with failing to register
as a dealer. The transaction, effected in June, 1943, was an assignment for
value by Boyer of an oil and gas lease on 40 acres of Texas land to a
purchaser in Florida. In habeas corpus proceedings Boyer was remanded to
trial on the above counts.
On his appeal to the Florida Supreme Court in 1944, he attacked
the very constitutionality of the 1943 amendatory Act. He argued that the
title of the act was insufficient in view of the mandate of section 16
of article III of the Florida Constitution.2' Boyer further contended that
such a lease, in Texas being a conveyance of an interest in land 22 with
none of the characteristics of a security as the word is commonly under-
stood, was not properly includible in the Florida Securities Act. This
devious strategy; that is, wedding a clear and traditional doctrine (the
constitutional mandate) with a not so valid inferential line of reasoning
(the 'interest in land') won Boyer his reversal. The court adopted his
arguments and the 1943 Act was declared invalid.
19. E.g., People v. Jackson, 24 Cal. App.2d 182, 74 P.2d 1085 (1937). See also,
Loss & CowErT, BLUE SKv LAW, 180-228 (1958); Note, Conflict of Laws Liability
for Interstate Sales of Securities Under State Blue Sky Laws, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 95
(1942). State v. Pullen, 58 R.I. 294, 192 Atl. 473 (1937).
20. Boyer v. Black, 154 Flt. 723, So.2d 886 (1944); See Annot. 153 A.L.R. 874
(1944).
21. "Each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter
properly connected therewith, which subect shall be briefly expressed in the title; and
no law shall be amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such case
the act, as revised, or section, as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.'
22. But see SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
[VOL. XlIII
MINERAL SECURITIES
-. The Boyer decision is subject to criticism on several grounds. To
borrow a phrase from Justice Hohlnes, "This case is decided on an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain."2 3 Justice
Sebring, speaking for the majority, said:
From the citation of authorities presented in briefs it appears
that in the State of Texas, at least, the sale and assignment of
a gas and oil lease such as we have here is equivalent to the sale
and assignment of a leasehold interest in land in the specific
tract described.24
Hc then repeated the citations. Curiously enough, at the head of the list
was the leading case that such transactions were 'securities' under the
federal securities act.25 Perhaps the court was without benefit of adequate
research because there were several extant opinions 2 from the appellate
level in Texas, California and others to the effect that such instruments
were securities under Acts with definitions sections substantially the same
as the Uniform Act.27 Not the least criticizable was the court's concern
for Texas law. If the court was sincere in its articulation of the 'insufficient
title' objection, why was it so concerned with the meaning given to
"securities" by a foreign jurisdiction, at the same time prescribing the
criterion of sufficiency of the title to the act to be the understanding given
to the language by a "reader of normal intelligence"? The concern should
have been for the legislature's intent with respect to Florida transactions;
not how Texas regards a Texas mineral lease .2  Retrospectively it seems
clear that the court was led into a misapplication (in its dicta) of a
conflicts rule by Boyer's argument. Justice Chapman dissented without
discussion; one could wonder if he were thinking of the Ryan case and
his minerals experience in Miller v. Car. 0
The most serious objection is that the Boyer decision, technically
limited to the constitutionality of the 1943 Act, cast doubts on the validity
of the whole minerals clause by the unfortunate dicta within the opinion.
Securities Commissioner Larson presented the obvious question to Attorney
General Watson (who had argued for the state on appeal) within weeks
after Boyer. Did the Boyer decision involve the validity of the whole
minerals clause and did it restore the original (1935) language? The
23. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1904).
24. Boyer v. Black, 154 fla. 723, 727, 18 So.2d 886, 887 (1944).
25. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See note 17
So. CAL. L. REV. 324 (1944). See also Annot. 163 A.L.R. 1065 n. I (1946).
26. Cases cited, notes 2, 3 supra.
27. Meer believes the Texas Act is not substantially different fron the Uniform
Act. Meer, The Texas Securities Act-i1957 Model: Facelift or Forward Look?
36 TEXAs L. REV. 429, 437 (1958).
28. Cf: "The mere fact that this deed and this transfer order are treated in Texas
as instruments conveying an interest in land does not preclude their being considered
in this state also as securities, evidencing an interest in an oil devcllpment project."
State v. Pullen, 58 R.I. 294, 192 Ail. 473, 478 (1937).
29. Ryan v. State, sup/ra note 9.
30. 137 Fla. 114, 188 So. 103 (1939).
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Attorney General gave the obvious answer:32 Boyer declared unconstitutional
and affected only the 1943 amendment, citing In re Wade. 2
The damage was already done. I-lad the court confined the discussion
to its articulated objection and dispensed with the Texas law dicta, the
legislative propriety of subjecting mineral transactions to Florida administra-
tive control would have remained unimperiled, regardless of the locus of
lands affected. A little over a year later, Commissioner Larson again
queried the Attorney General. "Is it necessary," he asked, "for fractional
certificates of interest in oil and gas titles on land in Florida to be regis-
tered . . " The Boyer dicta had evidently convinced the executive
department also. The Attorney General answered:
So lollg as the Law of Florida defining a security includes the
words rthe minerals clause as amended] and such words are given
their plain and patently intended meaning, the conclusion seems
to be inescapable that it is not necessary to register with the
commission fractional certificates of interest in oil and gas titles
in lands situated in Florida before such certificates can be sold
legally in Florida. (Emphasis added.) 8
In 1947, the legislature finally did something about the muddled
state of affairs by removing the troublesome appendage to the 1935
minerals clause. The clause now stands as it was amended in 1947: "4
"certificate of interest in an oil, gas, petroleum, mineral or mining title
or lease, or the right to participate therein . ..."
Comptroller Gay (also an officer of the Securities Commission) was the
next to so question the Attorney General. lie wanted to know whether
the new clause brought royalties within the purview of the Securities Act.
He also wanted to know if the Securities Commission had jurisdiction
over the sale of six leases whether in or out of the state. The Attorney
General replied that the term royalty "is too broad; each must be deter-
mined by the interest such as overrides35 and the like." As to the leases,
he answered in the negative, cryptically remarking, "I think discussion
of this question is unnecessary as the same should be and is answered in
the negative."' 61 One can almost hear him despairingly whisper that he was
just tired of the whole thing.
31. Op. ArT'Y GEN. 044-233 (Aug. 16, 1944).
32. Fla. 440, 7 So.2d 797 (1942).
33. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 045-538 N(ov. 15, 1945).
34. Fla. Laws 1947. ch. 24066 § 1.
35. "An overriding royalty is a certain percentage of the working interest which,
as between the lessee and the assignee, is not charged with the cost of development
or production. That is, it is an assignment of a part of the lessee's seven-eighths interest
under the conventional oil and gas lease and neither impairs nor diminishes the land-
owner's one-eighth royalty. It may be created by an outright grant by the lessee or by
a reservation in the assignment of the operating rights of the lessee. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF OIL AND GAs LAW, 239 1955). See also, Seaman, Financing Aspects of Oil
and Gas Transactions, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 550, 559 (1956).
36. Op. Arr'r GEN. 047-217 (July 25, 1947).
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Some fundamental conceptions were involved in the Boyer case, most
of which had not at the time ever been considered by the court. It is
true that in Miller v. Cart3 the court held that generally the terms rents
and royalties as used in oil and gas leases are synonymous and that oil
severed from the land is personalty, but for the most part, terminology
used by the court in Boyer and by the executive department in opinions
was borrowed from petroleum jurisdictions. For one thing, the court has
never been called upon to draw the distinction between an assignment
and a sub-lease of an oil and gas lease although it characterized the Boyer
instrument as an "assignment." The courts have held that where the
lessee (Boyer) retains a reversionary interest,38 rights to rental,"9 an over-
riding royalty,40 or where the interest conveyed terminates a month before
the expiration of the end of the original term,4' it is a sublease.42
Where he transfers his entire interest for the entire term, it is an assign-
ment.43 In Boyer the court noted that the "assignment" involved no profit
sharing or participation agreement and it was not "an obligation for the
payment of money." 44 It appears from that language that were the court
to be confronted with a question as to whether a given instrument were
a security, the criterion might be whether the lessee had made any
reservations or whether a share in the management had been retained.
The importance of the distinction can be easily recognized. The court
in Boyer said:
There would seem to be little question but that, subject to certain
limitations, the legal instruments by which gas and oil rights
are transferred from one person to another may be lawfully brought
into the sphere of operation of the Uniform Sale of Securities
Law and regulated as securities. Perhaps they ought to be.
(Emphasis added.) 4 1
That the court would apply the constitutional test of reasonableness to
a transaction to establish its qualification as a security seems clear. Stated
37. 137 Fla. 114, 188 So. 103 (1939). For other oil and gas language see, Ball v.
Yates, 158 Fla. 521, 29 So.2d 729 (1947) ("Joint venture"); Neel v. Rodman, 160
Fla. 36, 33 So.2d 234 (1948) (nature of instruments transferring minerals in place and
those transferring royalties); Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 So.2d 388 (1944)
("negotiating" in leases).
38. Schreek v. Coates, 59 Ariz. 269, 126 P.2d (1942) (a gold mining lease);
McNamer Realty Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Gas Co., 76 Mont. 332, 247 Pac. 166 (1926).
39. Palmer v. Bender, 49 F.2d 316 (D.C. La. 1931); rev'd on other grounds, 287
U.S. 551 (1932).
40. Cockbum v. O'Meara, 155 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1946).
41. Jackson v. Sims, 201 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1953).
42. See Brown, Assignments of Interests in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out Agree-
ments, Bottom Hole Letters, Reservations of Overrides and Oil Payments, Fifth
Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 25 (1954); Note, 23 Miss. L. J.
299 (19529; Moses, Assignment and Subleases of Oil and Gas Mineral Leases in Loui-
siana, 23 TUL. L. Rsv. 231 (1948).
43. Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931); Annot. 82
A.L.R. 1264 (1933).
44. Boyer v. Black, 154 Fla. 723, 727, 18 So.2d 886, 887 (1944).
45. Id. at 727, 18 So.2d at 888.
1959]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
another way, would it be reasonable to treat this or that minerals transaction
as one involving a security? Infiltration of economic philosophy by way
of the judiciary is by no standard a novelty. Clashes between judicial bias
and legislative intent sometimes take the appearance of East and West,
leaving the litigant with a prayer for a meeting of the twain. It would
not be atypical of the Florida Supreme Court to compare the characteristics
of a. given minerals instrument with those of the traditional corporate
security,
Some characteristics of the corporate security are separation of manage-
nient from ownership, fluctuating value, minute division of oweruship
interests, and the speculative nature of the interest.
Similar features may appear in a lease situation. \Vhcrc there was
ever a hope of minerals present, the large companies usually become the
original lessees of the usually small tract owner. Many times a company
does not wish to take the risk of exploration (especially in wildcat areas)
and "farms out"4 (subleases) part or all of the leaseholds to a smaller,
independent producing company. Very often the independent is unin-
corporated. The lessee company naturally reserves a royalty interest -
an "overriding royalty"4 7 - the amount of which depends upon negotia-
tions. Assuming the sublessee-producing company to be a partnership and,
not infrequently, in need of operating capital,48 it may sell fractions of its
own fractional interest. Just such a situation was brought to the attention
of Attorney General Ervin by the Securities Commission in 1951. 40
46. "A farm-out agreement is a contract between an oil and gas lessee and a
third person to assign, or an outright assignment of, the leasehold interest in a described
tract, conditional, however, upon the drilling of a test well and the performance of
specified obligations incident thereto. The purpose of such an agreement is to secure
the dnlling of a well prior to the expiration of the primary term of the lease." SULLI-
VAN, op. cit. supra, note 35 at 526-7.
47. "Although the term 'overriding royalty' is not conclusive of the nature of the
interest created, it does have a usage in the industry as denoting a share in the gross
production which is carved out of the lessee's interest." Id. at 240, citing Dashko v.
Friedman, 59 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) and noting that the term means free-
dom from costs of production and that it is not an interest in land. See also, Ilollis,
Depletable Interest in Oil?, 11 MIAMI L. Q. 244, 253 (1957): "The interest of the
lessee operator is called the working interest and bears all the expense of exploitation.
The lessee may transfer this working interest, reserving a fraction of the oil produced
(called an overriding royalty) . . .
48. "There are a number of miscellaneous methods of financing wildcat drilling
which should be given attention. In some instances the leaseholder sells overriding
royalties or participating units for cash to various individuals in order to finance part
or all of the drilling costs for a test well, or, perhaps, some of these costs are financed
by assigning overriding royalties to drilling contractors for free or low cost drilling."
Seaman, Financing Aspects of Oil Transactions, 3 U. C. L. A. L. REv. 550, 559, (1956).
49. The present owner of an undivided 1/32 interest in an undivided 3/4 interest
in an undivided 7/8 interest in an oil and gas lease on an 80 acre tract in Oklahoma
had sold it in Florida in 1950. The 7/8 interest was that interest transferred to the
lessee by the landowner, having by the lease reserved a 1/8 royalty interest, the usual
amount. This 7/8 lessee interest had evidently been farmed out, the lessee having
retained a 7/32 override. The 1/32 was one of the fractional interests transferred by
the sublessee to raise capital or possibly to 'let a friend in.' The Attorney General
advised that the question of whether such an interest was covered by the Securities Act
was not free from doubt and that until the courts settled the matter, the commission
should treat it and others like it as a security. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 051-393 (Nov. 2, 1951).
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Fractional interests are in this manner created so that they must be
expressed in decimals and the minute division of ownership interests is
analogized in minerals transactions3A Moreover, and admittedly ignoring
other important lease provisions, the major management and control has
been shifted from the major ownership (lessee and landowner) to the
sublessee. The analogy is not dificult to continue. It may very well be
that in Florida's future, the distinction between the nature of the interests
in the minerals will be determinative of what is a security.5'
Judicial activity in mineral securities has been negligible in Florida,
both in form and substance; yet, only the most naive would be willing
to assert that mineral commerce is nil in the state. 2 The-opinions of the
Attorney General continue to flow, 8 but for some reason or another, there
has, not been one single instance of a criminal prosecution for violations
of the act with reference to petroleum transactions since 1944. This seems
rather strange in view of the fact that registrations of such securities, as late
as November 17, 1958, were termed as "very nominal" by Dannitte H.
Mays, Acting Director of the Securities Commission. 4
The answer is'not to be found in negligible minerals'activity -hardly
an acre now exists south of Orange County that is not covered by a
current lease. It is almost as certain that every courthouse in the same
area could attest that one shipbuilding corporation has at one time or
another been the grfintee or grantor of mineral rights to literally tens of
thousands of acres of land. It might even be an interesting pursuit to
50. The writer knows of one lease in which the interests as to the gas and distillate
proceeds in a dual producer were as follows:
Twenty working interests ranging from .006798 to .085539.
Eight overriding royalty interests from .002504 to .157227, the latter being
held by the lessee oil company.
Twenty-seven landowner's royalty interests ranging from .000091 to .022841.
52. The following advertisement appeared in the October 17, 1958, edition of
the Miami Herald in prominent block form:
A $300 SPECULATIONFOR Bic STAKES
OIL & GAS LEASE issued by the State of New Mexico on State owned
lands. 40 Acre leases recorded by the STATE in YOUR name. New
Mexico's 1957 production 94,317,000 barrels of oil from 10,358 wells.
1,719 new producing wells drilled in 1957. We offer leases in areas where
new wells are now drilling. • Practically every major oil compay his opera-
tions in the State. Write for full particulars TODAY!
PETROLEUM LEASE CORPORATION
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.
This offer to sell did not have the benefit of registration. (Personal correspondence
from Dannite H. Mays, Acting Director of the Florida Securities Commission,
November 17, 1958.)
53. In the most recent one, Attorney General Richard Ervin advised that the sale
of a 100% mineral interest, conveyed by deed to a specific area of land was a security
within the purview of section 517. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 058-160 (May 15, 1958). This
appears unquestionably correct under the plain terms of the definitions section.
54. Personal correspondence, November 17, 1958.
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determine just how many readers of this article can recall one or more
mineral transactions without the benefit of registration.
III
EMBROILED IN OIL - AND SECURITIES, CALIFORNIA STYLE
A. General.
More than a generation ago, the California Supreme Court passed
squarely on the question of whether fractional interests in mineral leases
were securities under the California Corporate Securities Act.55 The
applicable clause of that law declared a "certificate of interest in an oil,
gas, or mining lease" to be a security and required the sale of it to be
preceded by registration. In Domestic 6 Foreign Petroleum Corp. v.
Long,5 6 fractional interests in such leases were for the first time held to
be securities. The California court had dealt with the question slightly
two years before in People v. Craven5 7 where minerals instruments were
involved, but the attack was on the constitutionality of the Corporate
Securities Act. Therefore, it can be said that the Domestic case settled
the matter."
In the latter case, the original lessees assigned fractional interests in
their interest in the oil and gas lease to three others in an ordinary business
transaction. No offering to the public or intent to evade the Act was found.
Consideration for the assignments was cash and legal services. Later, the
lessees made other assignments for cash. Finally, the lessees assigned all
their remaining rights under the lease to the plaintiff, subject to the rights
of the prior assignees. This last assignee, after oil was discovered, brought
suit to have the assignments to the first three assignees declared void on
the ground that the Securities Act had not been complied with.5 9 The
trial court and court of appeals denied relief, ruling that such transactions
were without the act.
The Supreme Court of California properly held that the instruments
were securities but refused to declare them void. It is interesting to compare
the suggestion made earlier that Florida courts should look to a transaction
to see if it resembles the traditional notion of a security, with the language
and reasoning of the court in the Domestic case.
55. Cal. Stat. 1929, ch. 707 p. 125; CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25008.
56. 4 Cal.2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935).
57. 219 Ca. 522, 27 P.2d 906 (1933).
58. Buttrick v. Seines, 209 Cal. 567, 289 Pac. 616 (1930) was an earlier case
yet but arose under a former, much less elaborate law. See also Smith v. George F.
Getty, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 274, 7 P.2d 733 (1933).
59. "Every security of its own issue sold or issued by a company without a permit
of the Commissioner then in effect authorizing the issuance or sale of the security is
void. Every security of its own issue sold or issued by a company with the authoriza-
tion of the Commissioner but which has been sold or issued in nonconformity with any
provision in the permit authorizing the issuance or sale is void." CAL. CORP. ConE
§ 26100.
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In decisions in this state and in other jurisdictions where it has
been contended that a transaction under attack did not come with
the Corporate Securities Act because it constituted only a sale
of specific real or personal property or an interest therein, the
courts have looked through form to substance and found that
in fact the transaction contemplated the conduct of a business
enterprise by others than the purchasers, in the profits or proceeds
of which the purchasers were to share . . . . such interests are
generally declared to be investment contracts.60
It is also interesting to compare the language with the Florida court's
discussion in the Boyer case of whether a lease is an interest in land.
What could be more reasonable than to disregard the form and look to
substance to see if traditional notions of investment contracts are involved?
Two important points were involved in the Domestic case that require
attention: Whether there was an "issue" of a security and the effect
on the rights of the parties by the fact that the instrument was executed
contrary to law. The first three assignees argued that their transferors, the
lessees, did not "issue" because there was no offering to the public. Therefore,
they reasoned, the transferors were only individual owners and on authority
of Pace v. Pace, 2 such an owner needed no permit to sell his interest. The
supreme court held such a requirement could not be read into the Act,
relied on Cecil B. De Mille Productions v. Woolery,63 and held the lessee's
transfer was an issue. The court also reached a reasonable conclusion as
to the effect on the interest conveyed by the violation of the Securities
Act. The intent of the Act was to protect the public; had the court followed
the general rule that illegal agreements confer rights on no one, that
intent would have been frustrated. The proper form of discouragement of
such activity is by collateral penal prosecution with the state as a party.
The court refused to entirely void the transaction and held the three
assignees entitled to share in the oil in accordance with the agreement.
B. The Criminal Cases.
The Craven and Domestic cases heralded a rash of litigation in the
nature of a dichotomy6 continuing until the present time. There are the
cases led by Craven where the state as a party has consistently and success-
fully prosecuted corruption in minerals transactions on the basis of non-
securities criminal laws, violations of the Corporate Securities Act, or
60. 4 Cal.2d 547, 555, 51 P.2d 73, (1935).
61. For "public offering" considerations under the Florida Securities Act, see
Robinton & Sowards, The Florida Securities Act: A Re-Examination, 12 U. MIAmr L.
Rrv. 2, (1957).
62. 73 Cal. App. 548, 238 Pac 1089 (1925).
63. 61 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1932).
64. "Every fancy article you read now uses the word 'dichotomy.'" GOLDEN,
ONLY IN AMERtcA-(1958).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
both. 5  On the other hand, there are the strictly civil cases led by the
Domestic case, where one party in a controversy over a minerals transaction
invokes the violation of the Act as a defense or as a ground for recovery
of money or securities under the contract. 6
In the leading criminal case, the defendant Craven was indicted for
violating the Corporate Securities Act. He had sold interests in oil and gas
leases without a permit from the Corporations Commissioner. The sales
took place in 1929 and 1930; therefore, some of them were governed by
the Corporate Securities Act as amended in 1925. 61 The applicable clause
was "any instrument offered to the public by an 'individual' evidencing or
representing any right to participate or share in oil, gas or other hydro-
carbon substances or other minerals of any sort, as yet undeveloped, or
in the proceeds of the sale thereof." Those sales in 1930 were affected
by the Act as amended in 192968 where the language was "certificate of
interest or participation, certificate of interest in a profit sharing agree-
ment, certificate of interest in an oil, gas or mining lease or beneficial
interest in title to property, profits or earnings."
Craven attacked the constitutionality contending that he was denied
property due process, but the court finally characterized his objection as a
policy one and proper concern of another department of the government.
He had cited Buttriek v. Seines"9 where the individual issuer was not
required to obtain a permit. The court reminded Craven of what he had
neglected to see - that the Buttrick case was decided under the 1917 Act70
which did not require the individual issuer to have a permit. It was not
until the 1923 Act 7' that this requirement was inserted.
65. People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal.2d 121, 162 P.2d 913 (1945); People v. Craven,
219 Cal. 522, 27 P.2d 906 (1933); People v. Shalhoob, 147 Cal. App.2d 455, 305
P.2d 264 (1957); People v. Chiat, 69 Cal. App.2d 503, 159 P.2d 445 (19453; People
v. Dutton, 41 Cal. App.2d 866, 107 P.2d 937 (1941); People v. Yant, 26 Cal. App.2d
725, 80 P.2d 506 (1938); People v. Daniels, 25 Cal. App.2d 64, 76 P.2d 556 (1938);
People v. Jackson, 24 Cal. App.2d 182, 74 P.2d 1085 (1937); People v. Rubens, 11
Cal. App.2d 576, 54 P.2d 98 (1936).
. 66. Morello v. Metzenbaum, 25 Cal.2e 494, 154 P.2d 670 (1944); Austin v.
Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal.2d 718, 134 P.2d 777 (1943); Domestic and Foreign Petro-
leum Co. v. Long, 4 Cal.2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935); Goldberg v. Paramount Oil Co.,
143 Cal. App.2d 215, 300 P.2d 329 (1956); Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev. Corp.,
135 Cal. App.2d 776, 288 P.2d 101 (1955); Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev. Corp.,
132 Cal. App.2d 496, 282 P.2d 574 (1955); M.C.N. Oil Co. v. Guiberson, 126 Cal.
App.2d 87, 271 P.2d 525 (1954); Paine v. Smith, 114 Cal. App.2d 767, 251 P.2d
18 (1952); Blackburn v. Union Oil Co., 90 Cal. App.2d 775, 204 P.2d 69 (1949);
Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App.2d 766, 127 P.2d 300, on rehearing after 51 Cal. App.2d
42, 124 P.2d 167 (1942); McFaul v. Deck, 30 Cal. App.2d 424, 86 P.2d 890 (1939);
Julian v. Schwartz, 16 Cal. App.2d 310, 60 P.2d 887 (1936); White v. Cascade Oil
Co., 14 Cal. App.2d 695, 58 P.2d 994 (1936); El Claro Oil Co. v. Daugherty, 11 Cal.
App.2d 274, 55 P.2d 488 (1936).
67. Cal. Stats. 1925, p,964.
68. Cal. Stats. 1929, p. 12 5 1.
69. 209 Cal. 567, 289 Pac, 616 (1930).
70. Cal. Stats. 1917, ch. 532 § 1.
71. Cal. Stats. 1923, ch. § 9.
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In subsequent criminal cases, mineral deeds72 as well as, interests
in leases have been held within the Act to subject the violator to prose-
cution. 73 It should be pointed out that in the case of People v. Jackson,
the transaction was in California, the lands affected were in Texas and
Oklahoma, and the forum was in California. This was eight years before
Boyer v. Black in Florida. The argument that the transaction involved
interests in real property has likewise availed the defendant nothing.74 In
another case, 75 this'last contention was argued more adroitly by referring
to a real estate broker's right to convey interests in real property, where
the transaction involved grant deeds purporting to convey interests in real
property. But the results were the same; the broker was not a securities
broker and therefore a violator. The "grant deeds" purported to convey an
undivided 1-100 of of an acre per unit. It was promptly noted by the court
that such a small amount of land hardly indicated that the parties intended
land but rather, the minerals.
It has also been established in these cases that it is also the act of
selling, whether by solicitation, offering, or subscription, which is prohibited
by the Act where there is no compliance.10
.In the fairly recent case of People v. Shalhoob,T the defendant obliquely
attempted to introduce the joint venture exemption78 of the Act. One
assignment of error set up the trial court's limitation of the defendant's
cross examination and although he did not unequivocally inform the
court, it was aware that his purpose to extend cross examination was to
establish a joint adventure.
In retrospect, one thing seems eminently clear: California has had
a remarkably successful experience in enforcing the intent of the legislature
to protect the public, supported by a firm and enlightened approval by
the courts.
72. "[A] mineral deed is an instrument which transfers the minerals as they exist
in place, or the right to obtain them. In form, it is similar to a general warranty deed,
and was adapted from the forms of conveyance used to transfer ownership of solid
minerals." Sullivan, op. cit. supra at 207,208,
73. People v. Jackson, 24 Cal. App.2d 182, 74 P.2d 1085 (1937).
74. People v. Rubens, 11 Cal. App.2d 576, 54 P.2d 98 (1936).
75. People v. Daniels, 25 Cal. App.2d 64, 76 P.2d 556 (1938).
76. People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal. App.2d 121, 162 P.2d 913 (1945).
77. 147 Cal. App.2d 455, 305 P.2d 264 (1957). See also Discussion Note,
6 OIL & GAS REP. 602 (1957).
78. CAL. CoaP. CODE § 25100 (1953). The elements of a joint venture under
this section are delineated in Beck v. Cagle, 46 Cal. App.2d 152, 115 P.2d 613 (1941):
"(a) a community of interest in the object of the under taking; (b) an
equal right to direct and govern the conduct of each other with respect
thereto; (c) share in the losses if any; (d) close and even fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties."
Sharing of the profits is not enough; it also involves the element of control
participation. Speir v. Lang, 4 Cal.2d 711, 53 P.2d 138 (1935). For a discussion ofjoint venture as applied to Florida mineral considerations see Ball v. Yates,.158 Fla.
521, 531; 29 So.2d 729, 734 (1947).
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C. The Civil Cases.
From the strictly civil cases there have evolved various interesting
aspects of the Blue Sky-mineral transaction litigation aside from the now
elementary rule that such transactions do involve securities. In White v.
Cascade Oil Co.,79 the defendant set up his own violation- an assignment
of a percentage of the lease - as a defense to a suit by the assignee asserting
rights under the assignment. Although the transaction was to be declared
void under the Act,80 the court invoked the traditional notion that no
one can take advantage of his own wrong. Good faith was held not to be
an element in the statute by the El Claro r case, where the intracacies
of the whole transaction would tax the analytical capacity of a Univac. In
Julian v. Schwartz, 2 by way of dicta, the court declared that creditors or
their representatives may assert the invalidity of mineral royalties issued
in violation of the Act and that one purpose of it was to protect merchants
and tradesmen.
Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co. 83 seems to have announced the rule that
a purchaser of a security is not in pari delicto with the issuer, even
though he has knowledge of the fact that no permit was issued. This-
in the face of a statutory declaration that such violative sales are void.
The court also stressed the all-important distinction between the investor's
status and that of a participant:
Where, however, as in the present case, the assignee is to share
in the conduct of an enterprise, the instrument representing an
assignment of a fractional interest in the production of oil is
not a security within the act . . . . (Emphasis added.) 84
The devices by which drafters attempt to evade regulation are
sometimes ingenious but usually futile. However, it is not believed that
minerals development is orientated solely towards securities regulation. The
greatest incentive for the ingenuity lies elsewhere. As Meer says, "The
fact that a substantial amount of oil exploration is carried out by inde-
pendent operators with limited financial resources has led to the develop-
ment of many novel types of arrangements designed to obtain capital without
losing control of the venture.'"8 5 (Emphasis added.) This provokes the
familiar picture of "operators" in a different sense with very little more
79. 14 Cal. App.2d 695, 58 P.2d 994 (1936).
80. "Every security of its own issue sold or issued by a company without a permit
of the Commissioner then in effect authorizing the issuance or sale of the securityis void. Every security of its own issue sold or issued by a company with authorization
of the Commissioner but which has been sold or issued in nonconformity with anyprovisions in the permit authorizing the issuance or sale is void. CAL. CoaP. CODE§ 26100 (1953).
81. El Claro Oil Co. v. Daugherty, I I Cal. App.2d 274, 58 P.2d 994 (1936).
82. 16 Cal. App.2d 310, 60 P.2d 887 (1936).
83. 21 Cal.2d 718, 134 P.2d 777 (1943).
84. Id. at 727, 134 P.2d at 783.
85. Meer, Oil Finance and the Securities Laws, 29 TEXAs L. REV. 885 (1951).
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than an idea. Too often the idea turned out to be a quilting party of pieces
of "blue sky" - sub-surface and sub-rosa - which undoubtedly inspired the
drafters of the Uniform Act to insert the minerals clause.
In McFaul v. Deck,86 despite an expression of an intent of the parties
to create a joint tenancy in an oil venture, the court glared through a fog
of formality and beheld the substance of a security. 8T
Morello v. Metzenbaurn8  was an action on a promissory note due
one day after date of December 15, 1941. The mineral interest was the
landowner's 1/8 royalty. The defendant had purchased it from the
landowner of a tract under an existing lease, the purchase authorized by
a permit from the Commissioner of Corporations., '8 In order to buy the
interest, the defendant borrowed the money from the plaintiff giving
him a note. The note was not paid when due and subsequently the
defendant executed an instrument in the form of a deed and assignment
conveying to the plaintiff the 121/2% royalty as security for the note with
the understanding that 1%, was to go the the plaintiff outright and the
rest as security. The rest of the agreement provided for an escrow of the
interest upon default of the note, the mortgagee (Morcllo) being entitled
to receive the security, notify the mortgagor and sell the security without
advertising. Such a default did occur and the plaintiff bid in the royalty
interest at $2,000, giving that much credit on the note. This action was
brought to recover a deficiency and then in an amended complaint, for
the full amount of the loan. The plaintiff had done this alleging that the
interest he had acquired by the agreement was a nullity, being transferred
without a permit required by the Act. The defendant admitted all of
the transactions but pleaded as a bar, section 580 (d)90 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which barred deficiency actions after a mortgagee's sale.
The question therefore was whether the transaction involved the sale of
an exempted security and specifically whether section 2 (c) of the Act
applied which provided:
The provisions of this act shall not apply to the sale of any
security in any of the following transactions:
2. By or for the account of a pledgee or mortgagee selling or
offering for sale or delivery in the ordinary course of business,
to liquidate bona fide debt, a security pledged in good faith as
security for such debt.
After a judgment for the defendant and on appeal to the Supreme
Court of California, it was held that the transfer to the plaintiff did come
86. 30 Cal. App.2d 424, 86 P.2d 890 (1939).
87. The very early case of Cecil B. De Mille Productions v. %Voolery. 61 F.2d
45 (9th Cir. 1932), involved promissory notes which had a feature by which they
were the instruments of transfer of overriding royalties. The court held them void
but noted that that they were so only because of the attempted transfer.
88. 25 Cal.2d 494, 154 P.2d 670 (1944).
89. See note 193 infra.
90. This section bars deficiency actions by the mortgagee or pledgee after he has
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within the exemption and consequently the action- was reilly a deficiency
judgment. The lower court was affirmed.
Some of these decisions seem to over-stretch the minerals clause. The
previously noted case9 ' involving grant deeds to napkin sized plots of
land and the recent Ogier cases92 are in point. In the latter cases, the
action was for the recovery of money paid on the basis of fraud. The
offending transaction involved grant deeds to land merely represented
as oil land and that the buyer would, at some future time, be able to
lease the purchased lands to the defendants. This was the sole connection
between minerals and the transaction involved. The feeling develops from
cases like these that the line, if indeed there be any, between securities
transactions and real estate transactions is discernible only after the court
has spoken.
Another disturbing result of the application of the California act
besides the Ogier cases came from a Ninth Circuit Federal caseY3 The
non-resident purchaser resold his fractional interest under a lease, back
to the seller. The original transaction was registered and a permit was
issued; however, the permit was limited in that future transfers without
commission approval were prohibited. The defendant argued that the
transaction in resale was void because the transaction was contradictory
to the terms of the permit. The Ninth Circuit held that such resales were
without the act and the Commission's limitation on the permit without
authority. Naturally the court had to concern itself with the Erie doctrine
and it required seven paragraphs to avoid it.
One writer believes that the lease should be without the Corporate
Securities Act although the question has apparently never been litigated.
It should not be within the Act . . . . for at least two reasons.
First, since a security is defined by Section 25008 as a certificate
of interest in an oil lease, it seems logical that the lease itself
was not intended to be included within the statute. Second,
the lessor rarely has a voice in the management of the drilling
operation of which the lessee is really the proprietor."4
California, without serious doubt, has led the way for minerals securities
regulation.95 That this efficient administration of a law, founded upon
the strongest considerations of public policy, has not unduly restricted or
impeded mineral development can hardly be contradicted. Nor can the
probability of such pioneer efforts being spread over most of the nation
be avoided. In California at least, it has not only become a result "devoutly
to be wished" but one eminently consummated. .
sold the property under a power of sale.
91. People v. Daniels, 25 Cal. App.2d 64, 76 P.2d 556 (1938).92. Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev. Corp., 135 Cal. App.2d 776, 288 P.2d 101(1955; Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev. Corp., 132 Cal. App.2d 574 (1955).
9. Rice v. May, 231 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1956).
94. 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 580, § 82 (1956).
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I V
UNDER TExAs BLUE SKIES
A. The Criminal Cases.
The history relating to the sale of securities in this State is
well known. The development of the oil industry emphasized
the necessity of regulating sales of securities issued on oil leases
and other instruments relating to the oil business. An enormous
number of worthless securities were sold to the public, and
nothing was realized on many of these investments by the buyers.
There was no restraint upon such sales nor upon those who made
them. The public was notoriously imposed upon and ofttimes
people were defrauded out of their life's savings. There was public
demand for protection against such sales. The legislature sought
to cope with the situation by enacting the Securities Act.06
This cogent statement by justice Sharp of the Supreme Court of
Texas in Kadane v. Clark7 summarizes the intent, purpose, and judicial
appraisal of the Texas Act as applied to mineral transactions. That Act
was adopted in 193598 and repealed the existing one. Professor F. Lanier
Cox said of it, "The most important changes effected by this act were
the inclusion of 'any instrument representing any interest in or under
an oil, gas or mining lease, fee or title' in the definition of a security
and the requirement for registration of dealers and salesmen." 99
This latter requirement of registration was the vehicle by which the
problem of mineral transactions involving securities rode to the Court of
Criminal Appeals in Texas and established the precedent in that jurisdic-
tion, 100 three years after adoption of the Act.
Atwood was convicted of selling oil and gas leases without having
registered as a dealer. In other transactions as well as the one on which
his conviction rested, he had approached lease owners with an offer to
dispose of the leases at an agreed price but only if he were able to find
a buyer. If he could find one, he would transfer it to the vendee and pay over
to the owner the previously agreed amount. Should no buyer be found, he
merely returned the lease without compensation to either party. On appeal,
he contended that he was an individual owner and the application of the
Act in that case was a deprivation of a property right guaranteed to him by
95. For an excellent analysis of the California Corporate Code as applied to oil
and gas transactions and procedures for obtaining permits see, Harshbarger, California
Corporate Securities Law Applied to Oil Transactions, 3 U.C.L.A. L. RFv. 540 (1956).
96. Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 498, 143 S.V.2d 197, 199 (1940).
97. Id.
98. Texas Acts 1935, ch. 100, p.255. Art. 600 (a) of the Revised Civil Statutes(so long the Texas Securities Act) is now Art. 581 by virtue of the 1957 "overhaul"
of the Securities Act. See notes 123, 135 infra.
99. Cox, The Securities Act. Special Commentary on the History and Develop-
ment of the Securities Law of Texas, 2 .TXx. REV, Civ. STAT. ANN. p. XIV (Vernon's
1. wtood . State, 135 Cr. R. 543, 121 S.W.2d 353 (1938).
1959]
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the federal constitution. The court repulsed this attack by noting that
even if he were the owner, his total activities constituted a course of dealing
clearly within the meaning of a "dealer" under the statute in which case,
the constitutionality was clear. The primary question before the court was
whether mineral leases in their transfer were securities. The authority for
the court so regarding them was not found from the California cases but
from, of all places, Rhode Island. That state, in Pullen v. State,'1" had
ignored the futile "interest in realty, not securities" argument and sustained a
lower court's view that mineral transactions were within the similar Rhode
Island Act.
Atwood also claimed discrimination. One of the provisions of the Texas
Act, a quite common one, exempted from registration transactions for
personal investments of an ordinary nature where the investor is not
otherwise engaged in selling securities. This rather weak argument was
quickly disposed of by the court, citing the United States Supreme Court
case of Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. -02
The Atwood case is one of only two criminal cases ever to reach the
appellate level in the criminal aspect of mineral transactions under the
Texas Act. It was followed a year later by Muse v. State.l" J. W. Muse
was sentenced to one year of imprisonment for selling an assignment of
an oil and gas lease to another without first having registered and obtained
a permit. The Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon the Atwood case,
affirmed the conviction and brushed aside a technical error asserted by
Muse for a reversal. The indictment had not declared to whom the assign-
ment had been made although the assignment was repeated in the indict-
ment. This was perhaps only a minor technical error, but it is interesting
to compare the result of it with the "accidental" reversal previously referred
to in the Florida case of Ryan v. State.'O4 Muse also tried the exemption
of personal investments argument but his course of conduct too, definitely
established him as a dealer.
It is difficult to assess and evaluate the success of the penal provisions
of the Texas Act. These two cases are unequivocal in supporting the
legislative intent but one could wonder if there really have been no viola-
tions since Muse which was decided a generation ago. As usual with such
regulatory laws administered by the "headless fourth branch," the problem
appears not to be in the adequacy of the law but in the enforcement of itOS1
101. Pullen v. State, 58 R.I. 294, 192 Atl. 473 (1937).
102. Hall v. Ceiger-Jones Co.. 242 U.S. 539 (1916).
103. Muse v. State, 137 Cr. R. 622. 132 S.W,2d 596 (1939).
104. 128 Fla. 1, 174 So. 438 (1937); The first oversight was finally corrected andjudgment affirmed a year later. Ryan v. State, 131 Fla. 486, 180 So. 10 (1938).
105. "Yet the author has been informed 4s recently as 11950] that only two or
three registrations of oil and gas interests have ever been effected under the Texas Act."
Meer. Oil Finance and the Securities Laws, 29 Tl.'xks L. Rrv. 885, 887 (1951).
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B. The civil cases: suits for commissions.
All but one' 0 of the civil cases'01 in which the Texas Securities Act
has been invoked with reference to mineral transactions have developed
from alleged dealer and principal relationships. These cases involve suits
for commissions earned in obtaining buyers for a lease, the plaintiff acting
on behalf of the seller, 108 for commissions in procuring a seller of a lease,
the defendant being the buyer,1 " for damages for conspiracy to defraud
the procurer of compensation for his services in disposing of estate
property;" 0 for commissions for obtaining a "shooting permit" for the
defendant;"1 and for damages, not for simple breach of contract, but
for breach of contract with a third person resulting in a loss of compensa-
tion to the plantiff who was the alleged procuring cause of a drilling
contract between the defendant landowner and another." 2
A thread of similar facts runs through all these cases. The plaintiff
generally is a dealer or one alleged to be acting in that capacity and the
defendant, after breaching his contract with the plaintiff, sets up the
defense that the transaction involved a security and that the plaintiff was
unlicensed to deal in such securities in contravention of the Act.
In the leading case of Kadane v. Clark,"," the plaintiff sought to recover
his commissions for procuring a purchaser of the defendant's leasehold
interest. The defendant contended the now familiar argument that Clark
was an unlicensed dealer and the res was a security. Clark had been
active in selling such leases for others, and the defendants -six members
of the Kadane family and the Big Six Oil Company--had been active
in the oil business. Clark alleged that he was a geologist, that he was also
in the oil business, that he contacted the Kadanes for the purpose of
106. Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146 (1947). This was a suit
for an accounting of partnership profits in an oil and gas venture. The plaintiff had
failed to allege in his petition that he was licensed as a Securities Dealer and the lower
courts had denied him relief. On appeal to the Commission of Appeals, Commissioner
Smedley reversed, holding that there was no burden on the plaintiff to allege compliance.
107. Great Western Drilling Co. v. Simmons, .........- Tex - , 302 S.W.2d 400
(1957); Mecom v. Hamblen, 155 Tex. 406, 289 S.W.2d 553 (1956); Breeding v.
nderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377 (1952); Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199
S.W.2d 146 (1947); Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263, 167 S.V.2d 735i1943; Fowler v. Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.V.2d 478 (1942); Kadane v. Clark,
35 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940); Flournoy v. Gallagher, 189 S.'W.2d 108 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1045); Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 141); Culver
v. Cockburn, 127 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). There are two federal cases
collaterally involving the Texas Securities Act in mineral transactions: Lack v. Borsumn,
44 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. La. 1942) and Auers v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 25 F. Supp.
458 (N.D. Tex. 1938).
108. Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tez. 496, 143 S.V.2d 197 (1940); Culver v. Cockbnrn,
127, S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Lack v. Borsum, 44 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. La.
1942).
109. Fowler v. Huits, 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.W.2d 478 (1942).
110. Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377 (1952).
111, Auers v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 25 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Tex. 1938).
112. Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263, 167 S.W.2d 735 (1943).
113. 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940).
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getting them to list a specific lease with him, and that eventually he
became the procuring cause of the sale of it to the Sunray Oil Company.
The supreme court reversed, saying:
The statute is strictly penal in nature, and was enacted solely
to protect the interests of the public. While the law does not
specifically provide that a contract made in violations of this Act
shall be void, yet, when the Act as a whole is read, and the
purposes for which it was passed are considered, we think the
very letter and spirit of the law is to absolutely prohibit sales
of securities not made under the terms of this law . . .. The con-
clusion is inescapable that a contract made in violations of its
terms is not enforceable. Any other construction would nullify
the very purposes for which it was enacted."14
Since the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had already declared such
a transaction as one involving a security in Atwood and Muse,1 5 as a
matter of "comity," the supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals
and held that Clark was not entitled to his commissions for acts done
in violation of a criminal law.
The Kadane case was not the first reported civil case in Texas involving
securities and minerals after Atwood and Muse. Culver v. Cockburn"'
was the first such case and it was decided by the court of civil appeals
about a year and a half before Kadane, yet there was no mention of the
Culver case in the Kadane opinion." 7 It was decided after Atwood and Muse,
yet Chief Justice Monteith said, "We have been cited no Texas cases
involving an interpretation of the provisions of the Securities Act."" 8, In
the Culver case, the plaintiff was an employee of the Cockburn Oil
Corporation and he entered into an agreement with George Cockbum
whereby Culver procured a purchaser of a lease and for which lie was to
receive a commission. In defense of the suit, Cockburn set up the "dealer-
security-no license" argument to avoid payment. At no time was the
lease in Culver's possession, he was not present at the transfer and the
jury found that he was the procuring cause of the sale. The court of
appeals held that he was neither a dealer nor was the lease a security.
The court cited the personal investment exemption of the Act and said:
There is nothing in the subject matter of the Act, however,
which would justify the presumption that the Legislature intended
to thereby regulate the type of a contract which might be made
by the owner of real property with an agent for the payment of
compensation for procuring a purchaser therefor." 9
114. Id. at ..- 143 S.W.2d at 200.
115. Atwood v. State, 135 Cr. R. 543, 121 S.W.2d 353 (1938); Muse v. State, 137
Cr. R. 622, 132 S.W.2d 596 (1939).
116. 127 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
117. Culver emerged from the intermediate court but it does seenm the supreme
court should have at least noted it.
118. Culver v. Cockburn, 127 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex, Civ. App. 1939).
119. Id. at 330.
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The court then cited the California cases of Lesser'20 and Buttrick v.
Seines 12 and the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Johnson,122 com-
pletely ignoring a fair majority of cases to the opposite. The fact that
subsequent courts in Texas have likewise ignored the Culver ease may be
some indication of its stature in the applicable case law. Another criticism
that can be made of it is that a security that is exempt is nonetheless a
security. Moreover, the exemption applies to the transaction; not to the
agents that may have effected it.""
In the case of Cosner v. Hancock,'24 which followed hot on the heels
of the Kadane'25 case, oil payments' 2" were held to be a security within
the Act and recovery of commissions for their sale was precluded because
of the plaintiff's failure to become a licensed dealer. The defendant Cosner
owned an oil payment reserved out of a one-sixth of the seven-eighths
working interest in a 160 acre lease and entered into a written agreement
with the plaintiff authorizing the latter to act as the exclusive agent to sell.
The court of civil appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff because
of his lack of license to "deal in securities." The court relied heavily on
Kadane v. Clark and brushed aside the only real distinction between the
two cases. Hancock had argued that just one sale should not preclude
recovery. The court answered:
We fail to see any substantial distinction between a person,
for a consideration, effecting the sale of a security for another
and effecting sales generally. It is true, that one is a transaction
for a single purpose, the other a series of transactions. In the single
transaction the same action is involved as in the series. There can
120. People v. Lesser, 123 Cal. App. 489, 11 P.2d 668 (1937).
121. 209 Cal. 567, 289 Pac. 616 (1930).
122. 89 Pa. Super. 439 (1926) (not a mineral case).
123. See text at infra. This case was later distinguished by the court in Cosner v.
Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) from Kadane v. Clark, supra
note 96 and the Cosner case:
Culver v. Cockburn . . we think, is distinguished from Kadane v.
Clark . . . and the case at bar, in that there the owner contracted to pay
the agent for obtaining one to lease land on terms satisfactory to him.
'[his seems to be semantic horseplay. It is the same thing as saying "I shall
hire you, not to sell something for me, but to get someone to buy from me." it is
very reminiscent of Albert's classic statement, "But' Pogo, you gotta admit it's a
devious writer that can say nothing in two directions at the same time." For further
discussion of the Culver and Cosner cases, see Meer, The Texas Securities Act-1957
Model: Facelift or Forward Look?, 36 TXAs L. Rv. 429, 437 (1958).
124. 149 S.W.2d 239 (Texas Civ. App. 1941).
125. Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940).
126. ". . . a promise by the owner of the working interest under an oil and gas
lease to deliver a fractional interest of the production of any or all of the minerals
covered by the lease to the payee, or to pay him the monetary value thereof, until the
payee has realized a certain sum from such deliveries or payments." Walker, Oil Pay-
merits, 20 TExs L. REv. 259, 262 (1942), quoted in BRoWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND
GAS LESS (1958) at 358, 359. Brown also notes "The oil payment has been ex-
tensively used in the financing of oil developnent, not only in the raising of cash but
in payments made to drilling contractors and supply houses. Ibid. See also, Hollis,
Depletable Interest in Oil? It MIAMI L.Q. 244, 256 (1957): "The right to take the
oil payment may be acquired by reserving it when assigning a lease, by purchase or by
drilling oil wells.
1959]
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be little difference between one casually selling securities for others
or for another, and in making that his business. Such a distinction
would cause the law to apply unequally and unfairly. In our opinion
the holding of the Supreme Court in Kadane v. Clark . applies
here. 12
In another interesting case, Fowler v. Hults,"28 decided in 1942, the
unlicensed dealer seeking his commissions was allowed to recover by the
Supreme Court of Texas because lie was acting for the purchaser and not
the seller, the rationale being that the Act prohibits certain sales; not
purchases.
In summary, Fowler's testimony tended to prove he was an agent
of the buyer; Hults' that Fowler was an agent of the sellers. Further terms
of the agreement were that the leases were to be deposited in escrow and
that Hults was to pay Fowler the 10% upon paying for the leases to the
escrow agent. Hults failed to take the leases and Fowler sued for the
commissions. Hults interposed the "securities-no license defense," one special
issue submitted to the jury as to whether Fowler was a dealer under the
Act was answered in the negative and there was a judgment for the plaintiff.
Commissioner of Appeals Smedley regarded the jury's finding on the
special issue as determinative of the fact that Fowler was Hults' agent and
not the landowners'. He also distinguished Kadane v. Clark12 in that in
the instant case, the leases had not been executed at the time of Fowler's
employment, whereas in the Kadane case, the plaintiff was dealing in
existing leases. Commissioner Smedley further emphasized the turning point
of the Fowler case by saying: "Sellers and sales are regulated and purchasers
are protected against sellers. The Act does not undertake to regulate
purchasers of to protect sellers against purchasers.'' 30
The 1945 the supreme court case of Herren v. Hollingsworth"8'
followed the rule established by Fowler v. Hults: "8 an agent or dealer
acting for the purchaser does not have to be licensed as a securities dealer
under the Act. It also illustrates the problem of the modern real estate
dealer finding himself on the twin horns of a dilenna. When he acts as
an agent in a mineral lease transaction, is he required to be licensed as a
real estate dealer, a securities dealer or both? In Herren, as in the Fowler
case, he was not required to be licensed as either simply because he acted
for the purchaser. Instead of a suit for commissions, Herren brought an
action for damages as a result of his principal's breach of contract with
another in a drilling agreement which Herron procured. He failed to
allege that lie was a licensed dealer in his petition and the trial court
127. Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S\.2d 239, 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
128. 138 Tex. 636, 161 SW.2d 478 (1942),
129. 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940).
1B30, 138 Tcx. 636, 638, 161 S.WV.2d 478, 480 (1942).
131. 140 Tex. 263, 167 S.V. 2d 735 (1943).
132. 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.V.2d 478 (1912).
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dismissed. On authority of the Fowler case, the supreme court reversed
both lower courts, emphasizing the fact that an agent for the purchaser
need not be licensed.
The case of Breeding v. Anderson'33 definitely deserves noting. In
that case, decided two years before the 1955 "overhaul"'13 4 of the Act, one
Anderson brought suit against Breeding who had been acting for the Lacy
estate and several other defendants, including the Texas Company which
had purchased the Lacy oil property through the plaintiff. Anderson alleged
that Breeding advised him that the Lacy properties were for sale and that
Breeding had such authority to sell. He further alleged that he and Breeding
agreed to a commission if Anderson sold the properties to the Texas
Company. Anderson had been buying leases, mineral interests and land
for that company exclusively for years. In his petition, Anderson did not
allege that he was licensed as a securities dealer or as a real estate dealer
but he entered a stipulation that he was not so licensed. After joinder of
issue, the defendants moved for a summary judgment on the ground that
the plaintiff was unlicensed and in which case he could not legally recover
his commission.
In Anderson's answer to the motion, he contended that he came
within the exemption of sections 3 (a) and (c)' 35 of the Securities Act.
These sections provided that the Act should not apply to transactions
at a judicial, executor's, administrator's, guardian's or conservator's sale
nor to sales by receivers. They also exempted sales by a seller in the course
of ordinary personal investment if he is not otherwise engaged in the
business as a dealer. Anderson further contended that since the Securities
Act governed his transactions, the Real Estate License Act' 36 did not
apply. These arguments were tured aside by the supreme court on writ of
certiorari after the summary judgment was granted and the court of civil
appeals reversed. The supreme court entertained no doubt that the cause
of action was governed by both licensing laws. That court also adopted
part of the opinion of the court of appeals in Sibley v. Coffield l '3 in which
the court had said:
Several court decisions have construed either Sec. 3(c) or
Sec. 33 b, or both of them together, and hold in substance that
even if, in fact, an owner or seller of stock or security were exempt
from obtaining a dealer's license and from registering such stock
or security, and even if in fact the sale or offer to sell by such
133. 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377 (1952).
134. For a relatively detailed history of the development and enactment of the
1955 Act and analyses of its controversial features, see Tinsley, Texas Securities Act, 18
TEX. B. 1. 273 (1955).
135. Section 3 (c) has since been repealed but the same provisions are incorporated
in the 1957 Securities Act, 2 TEx. REv. Civ. STA'r. ANN. art. 581-5 A and C (1)
(Vernon, Supp. 1958).
1;6, 19 Thx. REv. Civ. STAT. A,N. art. 6573 (Vernon, 1958 Supp.).
137. 193 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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owner or seller is made in the ordinary course of a bona fide sale,
such facts to do not exempt or relieve a person employed to aid
the owner or seller in making or offering the stock or security for
sale from registering and obtaining a license as a 'dealer' or 'broker',
as required by Sec. 2(c) of the Act, before he can collect a com-
mission or compensation for such sen,ices: or sue therefor in the
courts. (Emphasis added.) 88
Although the transaction might be exempt, the 'dealer' could not be
by virtue of the nature of the transaction. This is the point that the court
failed to see in Culver v. Cockburn.'0 The court in the instant case went
even farther and announced the obvious - that the facts evidenced no such
exempt sale and even if they had, Anderson was not an administrator,
executor,, etc. Furthermore, lie was not the owner of the securities and
therefore section 3(c) was inapplicable.
The most important aspect of the Breeding case is the double licensing
contention and the respective licensing statutes. Anderson had argued
that his actions were governed by the Securities Act, to which the court
agreed. But, further argued Anderson, that being true, section 3(c) of the
Real Estate License Law applied which provides:
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to, and the terms
'Real Estate Dealer' and 'Real Estate Salesman', .... shall not
include...
(c) Any person, partnership, or corporation who has secured a
license under the Texas Securities Act. (Emphasis added.)
There was only one thing wrong with Anderson's argument and the
court spelled it out - the exemption in the real estate law applies only
to licensed dealers, and Anderson had no license. Therefore, the court
reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the summary judgment
for the defendant in the trial court.140
138. Id. at 241.
139. 127 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
140. Compare Howard v. Simons, 285 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) where
the plaintiff, licensed as a securities dealer but not as a real estate dealer, sought com-
missions for the sale of a lease on downtown business property and asserted he needed
no real estate license. The cause arose before the exemption in section 3 (c) was
repealed. Field, summary iudgment for the defendant affirmed. Said the court:
In Texas, "The Securities Act" is unique, in that it includes oil and
gas interests as securities . . . Yet oil and gas interests, prior to severance
of oil or gas from the soil, are also classified as real estate. Elliff v.
Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558, 4 A.L.R.2d 191.
Thus there might have been serious confusion and possible conflict when a
licensed securities dealer, engaged in selling oil and gas interests as securitisg
was confronted with the provisions of "I'he Real Estate Dealer's Act""
I . . [Section 3 (a)] would give the securities dealer protection from" this -"
overlapping of oil and gas interests as securities and as real estate, as long
as the securities dealer was operating as a securities dealer selling oil and
gas interests. In the instant case it was stipulated that no oil and gas
interests were involved in the leasehold estate in question so section 3 (c)
was not applicable. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 480.
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The Breeding case should be carefully studied by all persons dealing
in such transactions not only in Texas but in Florida l' and in any other
jurisdiction having comparable dual licensing statutes. Such regulation,
despite occasional judicial assault, is definitely appearing in more and more
areas. Anderson is not the only dealer that has discovered the folly of
non-compliance too late.
Two other sales commissions cases should be mentioned in passing.
In the federal district court case of Auers v. Phillips Petroleum Corp.,142
decided in 1938, the plaintiff sought to recover his commissions for securing
a "shooting permit" (permit from a land owner to conduct blasting
operations in seismographic oil exploration) for the defendant. The de-
fendant posed the Securities Act as a defense and disclaimed liability because
the plaintiff was not a licensed dealer. The court felt that a shooting
permit was too far afield to read into the Act without further authority
from the statute or case law. Lack v. Borsum'4' involved mineral lands
in Louisiana but the contract to broker the mineral lease was made in
Texas. The federal district court, applying the lex loci celebrationis, looked
to the Texas Securities Act and relied upon Kadane v. Clark44 to deny
recovery to the unlicensed broker for not having complied with the Act.
Although the Lack v. Borsurn case is cited principally for the minerals
securities authority, some nice questions of conflict law were presented.
The 1945 case of Flournoy v. Gallagher145 cannot be discussed inde-
pendently of the more recent case of Brown v. Cole146 which has caused
such a furore in Texas. The former case was a suit for an accounting of
the profits from the sale of oil and gas leases. The plaintiff had entered
into an agreement and operations with Gallagher (who died during the
pendency of the suit) whereby they were to work together in acquiring
leases, the plaintiff laying out expenses, time and know-how, and upon
assembly of a set of leases and sale of it, net profits were to be shared
equally. The deceased sold some of the leases and Floumoy tried to get an
accounting from the executrix. He had been a dealer in such properties
but unlicensed and the defendant asserted this in bar of recovery. The
court chose to ignore the equality of participation and characterized the
suit as one for commissions:
Appellant contends in his brief that he does not come under
the Sectirities Act, for the reason that the agreement with the
deceased Joe Gallagher was made prior to the time the leases
were acquired; that this is not a commission suit; that the plaintiff
141. Concern has already been expressed in reference to the problems of this
type by Florida realtors. See Schuman, Securities vs. Real Estate, 6 FLORIDA REALTY
NEws 4 (1958).
142. 25 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Tex. 1938).
143. 44 F. Supp. 47, (D.C. La. 1942.
144. 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940).
145. 189 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
146. 291 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1956).
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was not a broker and did not seek a commission, but that it was
a suit to enforce an expressed trust. If from this we are to conclude
that the appellant by his petition alleged that lie was a joint
owner of the oil and gas leases , . . we still believe that the
plaintiff came under the Securities Act and could not maintain
the suit." 7
Brown v. Cole, 148 decided by the Texas Supreme Court was not an
oil and gas case but it provided a basis for what Meer believes"" is "an
implied exemption" in the Texas Act: that the creation of a joint venture
does not involve the sale of a security. The court in the Brown case said:
joint adventurers and partners are not to be denied the right
to receive their interest merely because of a failure to comply with
the Securities Act and we think it is equally true that a dissatisfied
joint adventurer may not recover from other joint adventurers
merely because of the failure of the latter to comply with the Act.' 50
Of course, the implied exemption is not expressed in the Texas Act as
it is in the California Corporate Code. 5 Meer speaks of it with muffled
approval and this writer concurs. The result reached in the Flournoy12
case definitely appears to have an unhealthy starboard list and one could
validly speculate that the case would have had a more even keel had it
succeeded the Brown decision.
The remaining two cases, Great Western Drilling Co. v. Simmons 53
and Mecom v. Hamblen'" are fairly recent and seem to close the door on
any speculation that the trend attempted to be emphasized in this article
is going to be thwarted -at least in Texas. Both cases involved "new"
phases of mineral securities transactions. In the Great Western case, the
unlicensed plaintiff (as a securities dealer and as a real estate dealer) was
denied commissions in the trial court for his services in securing "farm-out"
agreements for the defendant. The latter had asserted that Simmons was
not licensed, inter alia, as a defense.
The intermediate court reversed, sidestepped the Securities Act and
rested its decision on the Real Estate Dealer's Act. 55 That law, in Article
3995 (a) requires suits for commissions for the sale or purchase of oil and
gas interests to be in writing and in the instant case the agreement was
oral. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the intermediate court and
147. 189 S.W.2d 108, 110.
148. 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956). For an extremely well written analysis of the case,
its implication and comments on the new Texas Securities Act [2 Tex. REv. Civ.
STATS. Art 581 (Vernon, 1958 Supp.)] see Hill, Pitfalls in the Texas Securities Act,
10 S.W.L.J. 265 (1956).
149. Meer, The Securities Laws and Oil ad Gas Financing, 20 TExAs B. J. 211,
242 (1957).
150. 291 S.W.2d 704, 109 (1956),
151. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100 (m) (1953).
152. Flournoy v. Gallagher, 189 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
153. Great Western l)rilling Co. v. Simmons. 302 S.W.2d 400 (1957).
154. 155 Tex. 406, 289 S.W.2d 553 (1956).
155. 19 TI.x, REV. Civ. STA r. ANN, art 6573a (Vernon, 1958 Supp.)
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also relied on the Real Estate Dealer's Act. However, in discussing the
inapplicability of the Securities Act, the court dealt with Fowler v. Hults'5"
at some length which seems to indicate that even if the real estate law had
not been involved, the plaintiff's effecting the farm-out agreements would
not be considered a commerce in securities. Said the court, "The decision
[Fowler v. Hults] may also be authority for the proposition that, if the
plaintiff could be considered as 'selling' something to the driller, all he
could have sold would have been the mere possibility that the defendant
would make a lease to the driller, such a possibility not being a security."'' 7
Undoubtedly the court was trying to stress the fact that in neither case
did the procurer actually participate in an actual and present agreement
between the principal and the driller or farm-out contractec. This seems
to be at first glance a rational and invulnerable view but the question
could be asked if the plaintiff was not the cause of a contract being made.
The only answer is an affirmative one, even though the contract in prospect
did not come into being until long after the plaintiff performed his
services. The decision admittedly only incidentally involved the securities
Act, but it can be cited for dicta reflecting on the application of the Act
to farm-out agreement commission suits.
The Mecom'56 case involved an unusual and highly complex form of
election lease in an involved series of transactions. The case is authority
for the rule that retention of rights in an assignment where the rights
actually represent the value of services for obtaining the lease, there is a
security and if the holder was unlicensed under the Securities Act, he cannot
recover for such disguised commissions. This important holding, as was
indicated by the editor in the Oil and Gas Reporter,'" may very well be
applied in the future to overrides and production payments.
V.
OTHER STATES OF MIND
Illinois.
One of the most bitterly contested cases, and in the writer's opinion
the most interesting, ever to arise from a mineral security transaction is
the 1956 case of Hammer v. Sanders' 9 in Illinois. It was carried to the
Supreme Court of the United States where certiorari was ultimately
denied. 161 Space does not permit a detailed analysis of the facts and
arguments made in the case in its sojourn through the courts but briefly,
the following occurred.
156. 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.W.2d 478 (1942).
157 - Tex ---------.--------- 302 S.W.2d 400, 404 (1951).
158. Mecom v. 1lamblcn, 155 Tex. 406, 289 SA.2d 553 (1956).
159. 5 OIL & GAS REP. 789 (1956).
160. 8 111.2d 414, 134 N.E.2d 509 (1956).
161. 352 U.S. 878 (1956),
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The plaintiffs, Hammer and others, sought recission ofletter agree-
ments and recovery of sums paid under them to the defendant Sanders-FyeDrIlling 'Company. Working interests were to be transferred to the
plaintiffs for advancements of monies for development and upon completion
of wells in the leaseholds held by the drilling company, assignments of
interests were to be made to the plaintiffs. The property provided no
minerals (although several of the previous ones did) and the plaintiffs
contended that the transaction was one for the sale of a security and,
being made in violation of the Blue Sky law, voidable. The Illinois Blue
Sky law' 12 defines a security to be, inter alios, "any oil, gas or mining
lease, royalty or deed, and interest, units or shares in any such lease, royalty
or deed .... " It also requires the usual registration of the security and
provides that any transaction in violation of its terms gave the right to the
purchaser to void it and recover the consideration upon tender of the
security.
The Illinois Supreme Court exerted an admirable effort to examine
the whole transaction and establish its nature. It appears that the decision
finally turned on the manner in which the plaintiffs themselves regarded
the transaction:
Significantly, the plaintiffs treated all sums advanced by them
as 'intangible drilling and development costs' on their Federal
income tax returns, not as payments for a leasehold interest, a
security, or other capital asset." 3
Therefore even the plaintiffs regarded themselves as Participants in
the development rather than purchasers of an investment contract. This
is the other "implied exemption" of which Meer speaks. 64 The court
reversed in part and held the plaintiffs not entitled to recover; that
securities were not involved but a joint endeavor.
Iowa.
State v. Walters"I' was a criminal case in which the defendant was
charged with and found guilty of selling a 1/32 "pipeline interest" (royalty)
in a lessee's Y8 interest in a 160 acre mineral lease without having registered
it and others as a security in compliance with the Iowa Securities Law.186
That law contained the usual requirements for registration of securities and
securities salesmen and also the usual broad definition of a security,
including "certificate of interest in an oil, gas, or mining lease ....
162. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121V2, p. 132 (Srnith-Hurd 1953). For a fine comnen-
tary on the Illinois Act see, Young, The Illinois Securities Law of 1953, 42 ILL. B.J.
94 (1953).
163. 8 Ill. App. 414, -, 134 N.E.2d 509,513 (1956).
164. Meer, The Securities Laws and Oil and Gas Financing, 20 TrxAs 13J. 211, 242(1957.165. 244 Iowa 1253, 58 N.W.2d 4 (1953).
166. IowA CoDr, ch. 502 (1950).
VOL. X11l
MINERAL SECURITIES
The case is authority in that state for the ever-spreading' rule that
the transfer of a royalty interest for consideration involves the sale of a
security.
Michigan.
In People v. Blankenship,1' T the sole Michigan case on point, the
precise issue of whether mineral deeds can be securities under that state's
existing Blue Sky Law,168 arose in a criminal case in 1943. The defendant
was charged with selling fractions of his landowner's 1/ royalty interest in
lands in Texas and transferring the interest by mineral deed without filing
the "securities" with the Michigan corporation and securities commission.
The transaction took place in Michigan.
The trial court found the deeds as transferred, securities, and held
the defendant guilty of violating the Act. The supreme court regarded its
duty as one to "look through such rather ingenious devices of conveyance
and, in the light of the circumstances surrounding ... the execution and
sale, ascertain the substance of the transaction and the real intent and
purpose of the parties."'619 One of the interests transferred was an undivided
6/200 of the Vs royalty interest. Considering the tone of the opinion, it
was not too difficult for the court to regard the fractions involved, discern
the investment contract nature of the deed and rely on State v. Pullen'"
to affirm the lower court.
New Mexico.
Farrar v. Hood,"' a 1952 New Mexico case, was an action to quiet title
to mineral lands. As stated by the court, the questions on appeal were,
(a) whether the sale of speculative securities in contravention
of Chapter 44, Laws of 1921, 50-1071, 1941 Comp. [the Blue Sky
alw] is void or voidable; and if voidable; (b) whether the purchaser
of such securities is barred by laches from maintaining an action
for recission.' 72
The Act prohibited sales or offers to sell of speculative securities by
public offering unles a permit were obtained from the Bank Commissioner.
The mineral interests involved were transferred to a royalty owners pooling
company for aliquot unit interest certificates. The transfer was effected by
mineral deed and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the
unit interest certificates received by the mineral grantors -were securities
within the New Mexico Blue Sky Law.'7 3 On appeal,'the supreme court
167. 305 Mich. 79, 8 N.W.2d 919 (1943).
168. MICH. STAT. ANr. § 19.741 (1935).
169. 305 Mich. 79, 86, 8 N.W.2d 919, 921 (1943).
170. 58 R.I. 294, 192 At. 473 (1937).
171. 56 N.M. 724, 249 P.2d 759 (1952).
172. Id. at 726, 249 P.2d at 760.
173. 7 NEw MEx. STAT. AN. § 48-18. (1953).
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affirmed on the securities issue, relying on Marney v. Home Royalty Ass'n
of Okla.114 As to the issue of voidability, since the statute was silent, the
court was unable to determine a legislative intent of inherent voidness
and held that the transaction in violation of the law was voidable only
and subject to the defense of laches.
North Carolina.
State v. Allen" ', was a case that turned on the question of whether
mineral transactions involve securities and was a prosecution for violation of
that state's securities law. It was decided about a year after Ryan V. State
in Florida.' 76 In the Allen case, the North Carolina Capital Issues Law' 77
prohibited persons from dealing in securities without being so licensed.
It defined a security to be a "certificate of interest in an oil, gas or
mining lease .. " Ilie defendants were charged and convicted of
selling leases by assignnnt in North Carolina on lands in New Mexico.
The prosecuting witncsses were the purchasers of the leaseholds. On appeal,
the Attorney General relied upon and cited the Atwood, m78 Pullenl75 and
Muse"8 0 cases for affirmance. Despite the array of authority, and the clear
language of the statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the "facts of the case" did not come within the Act. One
wonders how explicit statutory language has to be for some courts to
follow the will of the legislature.
Minnesota.
The writer believes the first rcported case of a mnieral interest being
held as a security was State v. Ogden,' decided in 1923 by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota. The defendant was an owner of an 80 acre leasehold
of oil lands in Wyoming. Hc sub-dividcd it into 4,800 equal and undivided
units and offered Ys of them for salc at $120,000, terming them each a
"statement and purchase." The intent ws to later form an Arizona
corporation and the purchasers were to shc in the profits proportionally.
174. 34 N.M. 632, 286 Pac. (1930).
175. 216 N.C. 621, 5 S.S.2d 844 (1939).
176. 128 Mla. 1, 174 So. 438 (1937).
177. Pub. Laws 1927, ch. 149 j 2. By the present law the clause reads "certificate
of interest in a profit sharing agreeneut, any instrument representing any interest or
right in or under any oil, gas or mining lease, ... certificate of interest in an oil,
gas or mining lease ....
178. Atwood v. State, 135 Cr. R. 543, 121 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938).
179. State v. Pullen, 58 RI. 294, 192 AtI. 473 (1937).
180. Muse v. State, 137 Cr. R. 622, 132 SW.2d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1939).
181. 154 Minn. 425, 191 N.W. 916 (1923). A later case from the same jurisdic-
tion involved similar facts. Busch v. Noerenburg, 279 N.W. 34 (Minn. 1938). There
the purchaser siught to rescind her contract for the purchase of a fractional interest in
a tract of land, the latter being in contemplation of a corporation being formed, and
claimed it was a sale of a security. Held, not a security but an interest in land. See
Note, 6 DUKE B,A.J, 92 (1938) where the court was criticised for not revealing all the
facts and finding a security.
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Ogden sold some of these units and under the existing Blue Sky Law, 0 2
he was convicted of selling investment contracts without a license. On
appeal, the supreme court affirmed without too much discussion but it
did note that the defendant was without the isolated sale exemption.
Rhode Island.
The early Rhode Island case of State v. Pullen,ls8 relied upon by courts
all over the nation, put the landowner's royalty squarely within the Rhode
Island Blue Sky law.8 4 Pullen, the lessor of oil lands in Texas, sold
fractions of his landowner's one-eighth royalty in Rhode Island. In order
to make assignments effective by the terms of the lease, he issued them
in written certificate deed form accompanied by a transfer order to the
lessee. Rhode Island, thorugh its Banking and Insurance Division, sought
a restraining order against Pullen for not having registered as a broker
or salesman of securities. Pullen argued the "interest in realty, not securi-
ties" theory. He cited the Texas case of Waggoner Estate v. Wachita
County,'85 a tax suit in which it was held that the personal tax could not
be applied to a lease because it was an interest in realty. The Rhode
Island court correctly ignored the Texas pronouncement as having no
bearing on a Rhode Island transaction. Pullen also cited a lower court
Pennsylvania case 8" which had relied on the Waggoner case and the
realty theory to declare an oil and gas royalty not a security. The Rhode
Island court also ignored this attack and upheld the restraining order on
the basis of the statutory policy.
These documents, upon close examination, clearly present a
situation which demands that the realities prevail over the merely
technical effect of the legalistic form of the documents them-
selves. Really and actually behind the form of a conveyance of an
interest in land set out in these documents is an investment con-
tract, and it is peculiarly the kind of an investment contract which
lends itself readily to the perpetration of evil which the Securities
Act is designed to eradicate.187
Pennsylvania.
In the Pullen case the court was concerned as to whether the Hose"'
case from a lower court in Pennsylvania really expressed that state's policy
with regard to mineral securities under the Pennsylvania Securities Act. The
question was answered by the supreme court in the cases of Commonwealth
182. Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 429 § 2, as amended by Minn. Laws 1919, ch. 105 § 3.
183. 58 R.I. 294, 192 At. 473 (1937).
184. Gen. Laws 1923, ch. 273 § 16.
185. 273 U.S. 113 (1927).
186. Hose v. Pennsylvania Securities Comm'n, 38 Dauphine Co. R. 146 (1933).
187. 58 R.I. 294, 303, 192 Aft. 473, 477 (1937).
188. Hose v. Pennsylvania Securities Comm'n, 38 Dauphine Co. R. 146 (1933).
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v. Ferneau8 9 and Commonwealth v. Mason. 00 In these two cases, the
defendants were convicted of violating section 22 (b) which prohibited
any dealer or salesman from engaging in the business of "inducing holders
of securities to effect the sale thereof through a person registered [under
the Act or otherwise] directly or indirectly, in order to produce funds to
pay for other investments sold by such dealer or by such salesman for a
dealer" unless registered. This is a very unusual provision and at least
one writer believes that it closes a loophole still open in other Acts.
The defendants had made several transfers to one Martin in Pennsylvania
of leases and fractional interests in oil wells in New Mexico. From him
they received corporate stock and cash and neither was registered as
required by the Act.
On appeal, the defendants contended the transaction was exempt in
that the leases involved were within the government securities clause, but
the court pointed out:
Even if we were to assume that the oil leases were 'securities'
of the State of New Mexico within the meaning of Section 2 (f)
(1), the defendants would be in no better position. Our under-
standing of the evidence is that only the oil leases were instru-
mentalities of the State of New Mexico. The transactions involv-
ing oil interests would not be affected [by the section]. 91 (Emphasis
added.)
Moreover, it was the combination of section 22 (b) and the selling that
made up the offense. This activity appears clearly within the Act and the
court appeared to have little difficulty in affinning the convictions.
VI
FLORIDA CRITIQUE
A. General considerations.
The foregoing empirical treatment of mineral securities has been pre-
sented in order to provide a broad picture of what has happened in the field,
with the hope that a better understanding of similar problems in Florida
would result.
Several conclusions can justifiably be drawn. First, securities regulation,
and that specific type related to minerals, has experienced a steady expan-
sion- qualitatively and quantitatively. More and more states have extended
regulation to mineral securities. On the whole, the vast majority indicate a
desire to encompass all mineral transactions with only a few exemptions.
This is but legislative intent.
The second conclusion, an inescapable one, is that today, the great
need is not for adequate legislation, but rather, vigorous and informed
189. 175, Pa. Super. 570, 106 A'2d 624 (1954).
190. 175, Pa. Super. 576, 106, A.2d 877 (1954).
191. 175, Pa. 570, 593, 106 A.2d 624, 676 (1954).
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enforcement. Despite the ultimate reasons of political philosophy, the
immediate fact of grossly inadequate appropriations for the Florida Securities
Commission (and others like it) is the bottleneck in needed enforcement.
It is nothing short of shocking that for the 1957-1959 biennium, the
Florida Securities Commission had appropriated to it only $192,000-
about $26,000 less than the appropriation for the Ringting Museum.19 2
Another observation that can be made is that the nature of mineral
interests is relatively foreign to the legal profession as well as the layman.
This is very true in Florida as well as other states. The proposal that a
mineral instrument can be a security is doubly incredible -even to some
of the courts.
The commission cases in Texas and California point to a crying need
for legislative action to limit and delimit the application of the real estate
and securities licensing laws in regard to mineral transactions. A dealer
or agent in the field has a right to know in advance whether his con-
templated action is prohibited or restricted by the law, and to require
him to seek the advice of an attorney who can only tell him to "try it
and see what happens" is not complimentary of the modem legislature.
Neither is it the proper atmosphere for commerce. The question might
be posed as to whether this could not more properly be done by the
administrative ruling function of the Securities Commission. This writer
does not so believe-and does not so recommend-at least not until
dissemination of administrative policy reaches a higher degree of efficacy
than at present. Administrative rule-making is too often lacking but more
often, and more importantly, fails to be disseminated in a desired manner.193
Seldom a day goes by in Florida but that newspapers all over the State
exhibit potential violations of the securities act in their advertising see-
192. FLA. STAT. § 282, Items 52, 54 (1957). Florida is not tile only state with
budget problems in the regulaton of securities. See Reavely & Barns, Operation of
the Texas Securities Act, 10 S.W.L.J. 249, 250 (1956) in which it is pointed out that
the Securities Division of the Secretary of State's office, was given $45,000 in 1937
through 1940, and $42,196 in 1950; yet, from 1951 through 1954 the legislature tried
to reduce this amount to $25,000! They go on to say:
In 1955 and 1956 the appropriation was increased to $65,228 and
the Securities Division has been able to switch from more or less a filing
agency to an enforcement agency that has, to some degree, taken the
offensive in this difficult field of regulation. Obviously, its budget is
still pitifully small and wholly unrealistic when the vast and complicated field
of securities in a growing state are considered, but it is a step in the right
direction. (Emphasis added.)
Although the Florida appropriations do not seem to provide a sufficient
basis for needed field personnel, the commission is reported to be on a self-
sustaining basis through fees, etc. at its present level of operations.
193. An exception to this blanket generalization is California. As an example of
the high degree of administrative development in that state see CALIF. AnDM. CODE,
of which section 421 is illustrative:
"Application for Permission to Transfer Royalty Interest in Escrow.
An application for permission to- transfer royalty or mineral interests in
escrow shall contain the following:(a) A statement signed by the proposed transferor describing the
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tions.1 4  Commission monitoring of advertising media, so desperately
needed, could be both relatively inexpensive and conducive of facilitating
the purpose of the Securities Act. Promotional activity takes many forms
but advertising is its major-outlet and the one by which the public is most
often abused. It is complimentary of human nature that most of these
offerings are legitimate and violations are often unintentional. However,
fraud is not the only evil which the Act was designed to eradicate; simple
irresponsibility and ignorance in commerce with the public is another
which, together with fraud, bilks investors of millions of dollars annually.
In a romance industry such as minerals development, this is most rampant.
Surely, if Florida can spend a quarter of a million dollars in two years to
satisfy carnival curiosity in one muscum, it can well afford to spend twice
that amount to protect the curiosity seeker in his investment pursuits.
B. A specific problem area and a suggested solution.
By chapter 475.01 (2) of the Florida statutes, "Every person who
shall, in this state, for another [and for a consideration, sell, etc.] . . . any
interest to be sold, the consideration to be paid therefor, and the name
of the transferee.
(b) A statement signed by the proposed transferee that the transferor
disclosed to the transferee:
J ) The date the proposed transferor acquired the interest.
The source from which the proposed transferor acquired the
interest.
(3) The valuation of the interest and the basis upon which such
valuation was determined.
(4) That none of the proceeds of the transfer, will be applied
directly or indirectly to the promotion, development or
operation of the wells or properties on which the interest
is based.
(5) '[hat the assignment or transfer of the interest will be
recorded by the proposed transferor on behalf of the pro-
posed transferee in the county in which the property on
which the interest is based is located; or, that the proposed
transferee has been instructed by the proposed transferor to
record said assignment.
(c) A written commitment by the producing company, or the holder
of the leasehold if there is no producing company, or the original issuer
of the interest, or an authorized disbursing agent to whom the proceeds
from the interest are to be paid, that it will recognize the proposed trans-
feree as owner of such interest, and will pay all royalties to which such
interest is entitled to the transfeiee." See also, Hlarshbarger, California Cor-
porate Securities Law Applied to Oil and Gas Transactions, 3 U.C.L.A.
L. Rxv. 540, 543 (1956).
194. As an example, the following advertisement appeared in a prominent metro-
politan newspaper recently:
800 PATENTED MINING CLAIMS FOR SALE
GOLD, SILVER, LEAD, ZINC AND COPPER
7500 ACRES - SILVERTON, COLORADO
One of the Richest precious metal districts in the world
Will sell (Retaining a 3% Royalty)
for less than cost of Patent and Taxes Paid. Terms.
U. S. Mining Engineer's Maps; Reports, Blueprints, etc.
w rite ---------_ - ----------------- -- - - --  - --.. . .. . .. . .
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real property, or any interest in or concerning the same, including mineral
rights or leases . . . siall be deemed to be a 'real estate broker' or 'real
estate salesman'" and must be so licensed and registered by other provi-
sions. By an enactment in 1955,1'" the term "real estate" or "real property"
includes leaseholds, assignments of leaseholds, subleaseholds and "any and
every interest or estate in land."
When these provisions are considered vis a vis the oil and gas provi-
sion of the Securities Act, Mr. Shuman's caveat'9 appears more than
timely. Where one effects the transfer or sale of an interest in minerals in place
for another person in Florida, regardless of where the land is situated, must
he have both licenses or only one? If only one, which one? The Ryan'9 7
case brought such transactions within the Securities Act and the Boyer'98
case affected only the 1943 amendment. Obviously, and excluding all else,
the agent must be licensed under the securities law. But then chapter 475
et seq. apparently requires him to be licensed as a real estate agent. These
twin horns of a regulatory dilemma can be and should be clipped in the
near future to prevent personal jeopardy as well as maintain desired
regulation. 99
The Texas and California cases provide very little help except to
accentuate the fact that a problem exists. This writer believes that the
answer lies in a combination of legislative direction, judicial awareness
and administrative supplemental rule making. It is believed that the
origin of the problem, aside from lobbying activity, lies in the long standing
(and now useless) concept of mineral interests as being "interests in realty."
It was this hobgoblin with which the supreme court tangled in Boyer v.
Black. 00 It has already been shown how closely mineral instruments
resemble investment contracts and such contracts are personalty. Also, it
is well settled, even in Florida, that once minerals are severed from the
ground, they are considered personalty. Prior to that time rights in them
might as well be considered as intangible personalty due to the sub-surface
nature of minerals.
195. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29983 § 1.
196. "It, therefore, becomes important to the real estate broker to recognize when
a transaction involves a security as defined in Chapter 517, Florida Statutes, Other-
wise both the broker and his client may be subjected to severe criminal penalties.
The first obvious real estate transaction which could involve a security is a
transaction involving an oil lease." Shuman, 6 FLORIDA REALTY NEws 4 (1958).
197. 128 Fla. 1, 174 So. 438 (1937).
198. Boyer v. Black, 154 Fla. 723, 18 So.2d 886 (1944).
199. A collateral aspect of the problem-Who is an issuer?-is apparently rectified
in the new Uniform Securities Act by section 401 (g):
'Issuer' means any person who issues or proposes to issue any security,
except that .. . (2) with respect to certificates of interest or participation
in oil, gas or mining titles or leases or in payments out of production under
such titles or leases, there is not considered to be any 'issuer."
200. 154 Fla. 723, 18 So.2d 886 (1944). For an excellent discussion with refer-
ence to the realty concept, see comment, Oil and Gas Interests as Securities, 26 Calif.
L. Rev. 359 (1938).
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There is no longer any justifiable reason why they should be regarded as
realty. With this in mind, the suggestion is made that the whole problem
could be solved by specific words in the Real Estate License Law 21 that such
interests are not within its provisions. Specific reference to mineral interests
- leases, assignments of leases, royalties, etc. - is necessary to avoid affecting
the leasehold interests in buildings and land which obviously should remain
within the law. The courts, following such legislative direction would no
longer have any compulsion to wander into the "realty" concept and
administrative officials. could issue rules with assurance.20 2
201. FLA. STAT. § 475 (1957).
202. The American courts are by no means uniform about the nature of the interest
acquired by a mineral lease. A majority appears to favor the incorporeal heritament theory;
a lesser number of states, including Texas, regard the property as realty; and a few
others are not precise. See BRowN, 'im LAw Oi OIL AND GAs LEAsEs, 25 (1958).
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